This statement is the Ministerial Statement made at the time
of the cancellation of the 
Wolffdene
Dam. Notice the assurances given at that time. Those assurances were not met due
to a time of normal "uncommon event" activity of 3.7 years between
these dam filling events not being recognized.
The attitude publically expressed by our leader in charge for
most of the time was "Why would I bother about water? We had plenty of
it." The random activity of "Uncommon events" was not observed.
It is outlined in the heading above, that most occurred below the 3.7 year
average which means that those above can be up to 11 years.
We have also witnessed the severity of these events that can
occur. My warnings to those in charge fell on deaf
ears.
This section is designed to draw attention to the decision making process of our
Leaders on the entering into and emergence from a rare period of "uncommon
events" in the life of the Wivenhoe Dam. In my view they are quite similar,
one being made in a time of "plenty" and the other when the
"plenty" was withdrawn. To this we now add the inevitable return of
"Uncommon events" with a vengeance. 300 per cent of the Wivenhoe Dam
capacity went over the dam wall with that dam unable to cope with major
flooding. Marshalling of our water supply escaped the ability of those in charge
to recognize the essential elements of the problem.
Once the myth of the "worst drought in 100 years "
is dealt with and uncommon events are understood, the decision to cancel the Wolfdene Dam comes into stark
perspective.
The Dam was cancelled in early 1990 shortly after a change of
Government in December 1989. The Wivenhoe dam had been in operation for four
years.
Wivenhoe was clearly a storage and flood mitigation dam for the 
Somerset
and was positioned below the Somerset on the Stanley and Brisbane Rivers
junction. The chart outlining
the Summer Rains for the last 96 years supports this contention. In its
own right it provides little to our water supply except for random "uncommon events". The
Somerset has a much more efficient catchment although much smaller in capacity
and catchment area. Nevertheless, with higher rainfall, it provides most of our water supply. Reference
the "Wivenhoe Dam" button .
The Water Engineers and Hydrologists were obviously aware of this.
The Courier Mail has made mention of a Key advisor on water being a world class
Engineer and Hydrologist involved in research and recommendations for all of the
State's major Dams including the Wivenhoe and Wolfdene dams.
The Government had purchased
all of the land required for the Wolfdene dam. In dispute were a few blocks on
the thirty year mark. Reference is direct contact with the Dam Manager at that
time though our common interest in school activities. He and his Chairman were removed shortly
after the New Government took over.
I understand the Wolfdene Dam was to be a major Dam in the
category of the Wivenhoe as described in the pages of the Courier Mail. It was to be located just south of Brisbane.
The
Gold Coast Bulletin leaves one in no doubt as to their position on the
cancellation of the Dam, the reasons why and who they believe is
responsible. The Bulletin appeared unaware that the people mentioned went to the
1989 election on the basis of cancellation of the Wolfdene Dam and supported by
the Liberal Party.
The Gold Coast Bulletin has arrived at a conclusion that they
lost control of their water asset, the Hinze Dam, because of the lack of
planning of the people mentioned. The Bulletin appeared unaware of uncommon events
in the same way that our current leaders are. The past decision makers mentioned
on their front page appear to have overlooked, or have been completely unaware
of the implications of the natural occurrence of uncommon events of 1988 and 1989 referred to later in
this section.
To add further balance to this subject, SEQWater operations manager
drew our attention to four uncommon events 
occurring in the years 1986 to 2001.
1986 was the start of the Wivenhoe and the inflows of 1992 and 1999 were readily
identified by him. See the last three paragraphs.
In 1988 in the single month of April, a non-summer
month, a high Rainfall of 440mm occurred. Being a non-summer month is rare in itself. It
was followed by a similar event in April of 1989 of 564mm. These events were sufficiently
large to fill the dams. At that early stage the Dams were full and overflowing.
The last of these two events were seven months before the
election.
In retrospect, this very high level may have been sufficient to draw
incorrect conclusions against the advice of the Engineers and Hydrologists. This advice must
necessarily have been
present when the land purchase was proceeding.
This was followed up by the large inflows of 1992, 1996 and 1999
which filled the dams and buried the view of heavy and steady population
growth's requirements and the implications of the cancellation of the Wolfdene
dam.
Conclusion
The Wolfdene Dam cancellation is central to - entering into
and emergence from a rare period of "uncommon events"
We have seen that the cancellation of the Wolfdene dam has
denied us the provision of water except on a restricted basis. The decision
relates to the entering this rare period of 5 uncommon events in 12 years.
We are now seeing that as we emerge from this period, our
current leaders attribute it to a "drought" with all the decisions
being made on this basis.
A little further down the track people in SEQ realised that
with the Backup of Wolfdene Dam most of the damage in Brisbane and Ipswich could
have been avoided by pre-release in the Wivenhoe.
The solution lies in the harnessing of the surpluses from
these uncommon events with further spare capacity to deal with both equations.
This web-site provides the solution.
Advice offered to Deputy
Premier Bligh and the relevant Minister Hinchcliffe
I offered the following advice to these Ministers. It was
not prophetic. It was not climate change. It was straightforward mathematics.
The following is an
extract from my letter to Hon. Mr S. Hinchcliffe, the then Minister for
Infrastructure and Planning, sent on the 23rd April 2009 three weeks before the
May 2009 "uncommon event". The alert to the Minister followed a meeting with him in January
2009. The meeting had the support of the senior policy advisor to the PM (Kevin
Rudd).
"The way I see it, the difficulty for you and all who support the
Traveston is that on the mathematical certainty of the return of the
“uncommon events” the dams will overflow. That by itself should have people
in SEQ questioning if those in charge understand what they are doing.
Historically there has been 11 “uncommon events” within 1 year of each other
(April 1988 & April 1989 for example) and there will be a tremendous loss of
water over spillways with full dams. In my view justification of the Traveston
will be under severe stress and storage in the Borumba Dam together with its
additional yield, vindicated."
The following is an extract from my letter
to Premier Anna Bligh on the 18th January
2008 when dealing with the Traveston Dam project.
“Uncommon
events” proved to be the lifeblood of SEQ from 1986 to 2001, filling the Dams
to overflow four times and covering expanding population requirements with ease.
Although the official records disclose there was
an absence of “uncommon events” between 1974 and 1988, there were five such
events in the short life of the Wivenhoe Dam (1988 to 1999 and a topup in
Feb.2001). A high proportion of those events flowed over the spillway
and were lost because of lack of storage.
They will return. When the uncommon events return, we will not
have sufficient storage space to retain the surplus water from
them, except for the first one. Most of that water from uncommon events
would now be lost whereas they were our main provider for the 16 years to 2001.
End
quote
The Traveston is now historical but the alert to Minister
Hinchcliffe and the use of the Borumba Dam as its replacement is still valid.
The alert to Premier Anna Bligh was on the same subject. This
procedure eliminates the planned three desalination plants and avoids most of the
construction and ongoing costs. Further reading Borumba
Dam Proposal and Borumba Dam Appendix
February 2007. Output from the
Government IQQM computer model, covering the 111 years 1890 to 2000, has proven Mr Drury correct. In essence 300mm of
rain in the catchments in a few days is a flood and, in the right circumstances,
can fill the dams from scratch. On the other hand 3 months of 100mm a month is a
comparative
trickle. These facts can be buried in official overall rainfall statistics the
use of which in dam performance can and did throw up statistical aberrations.
records from 1841 reveal that
they occur on average every 3.7 years with most below that average. Therefore
those above can extend well above that average such as the recent period of 2001
to 2007.
Mr Drury also provided dam level charts
which were not published by the Courier Mail. They provided clear evidence of
the importance of "uncommon events" and the inability of the
"Summer wet season" to provide sufficient water from as far back as
1992. 
